Recent evidence on the respective contributions of institutions and trade to income levels across countries has demonstrated that -once endogeneity is consideredinstitutional quality clearly dominates the effect of trade. We argue that overall trade is not the most appropriate measure for technology diffusion as a source of productivity growth and propose to focus on imports of research and development (R&D) intensive goods instead. Overall, we confirm previous findings that institutions matter most and that overall trade is not positively associated with per-capita income levels. Yet this does not hold for technology trade, as there is a positive and significant linkage between technology imports and income levels. This outcome is robust to various model specifications, including an instrumental variable approach.
Income per worker in the five richest economies is on average 64 times higher than in the five poorest nations.
1 Almost certainly, there are few questions that are of higher importance to development economics as to ask which factors contribute to this enormous gap. A prominent strand of the literature believes that per-capita income differences are mainly driven by differences in technology, which affect the productivity of capital and workers (Romer, 1993; Prescott, 1998) . In fact, recent development accounting studies document large total factor productivity disparities across countries (Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli and Coleman, 2002; Caselli, 2005) .
While these studies are useful to measure the effects of productivity differences, they do not shed light on the identification of the deep determinants that explain differences in international productivity levels. Addressing this important research topic, recent studies have emphasised three mutually related causal factors: (1) geography as a relevant determinant of climate, natural resources endowments, morbidity rates and natural barriers to interact with other economies (Diamond, 1997; Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs, 2001) ; (2) openness to international trade as a channel of technology diffusion and the gains through exchange and specialisation (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Irwin and Terviö, 2002; Noguer and Siscart, 2004) ; 2 and (3) institutions as the rules and norms prevailing in a society that shape an individual's productive behaviour (North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004) .
These three determinants ultimately exert a fundamental influence on the well-known channels that promote economic growth: factor accumulation and technological progress. Finding the relative importance of each factor is a task that involves the treatment of endogeneity of openness and institutions, since geography is the only exogenous determinant. More open economies may induce higher growth rates and vice versa, institutional quality may have an impact on income levels, but richer economies may also have a preference for better institutions.
So far, only Rodrik et al. (2004) have attempted to estimate the relative relevance of each deep determinant of economic development, sorting out a complex web of causalities and employing a set of historical and geographical instruments that has been developed in recent cross-sectional growth empirics. In particular, they use the Frankel and Romer (1999) geographic instrument to estimate the effect of actual trade, and historical variables, such as the fraction of population that speaks English or another major European language as a mother tongue (Hall and Jones, 1999) or the mortality rates of colonial settlers, to estimate the effect of institutional quality (Acemoglu et al., 4 2001 ). Once endogeneity is taken into account, they find that trade openness does not have a significant influence on income levels, and conclude the primacy of institutions over the other factors.
In this paper, we argue that the total volume of trade as a measure of exposure to foreign technologies as an important source of productivity gains is not the most appropriate one. Rather, we focus on imports of research and development (R&D) intensive capital goods to capture technology diffusion. In growth models without spillovers and where new technologies arise in new vintages of capital goods (Greenwood et al., 1997) , trade gives access to foreign goods and implicitly to embodied technologies. In this case, trade in R&D intensive goods brings about some benefits in the form of an increase in capital good's efficiency. Moreover, in endogenous growth models with knowledge spillovers (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991ab; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) trade in differentiated capital goods raises capital efficiency and total factor productivity through learning and imitation.
We rely on the fact that worldwide R&D activities are concentrated in a handful of (OECD) countries that are the major producers and exporters of capital goods (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 2001 ) and consequently, import of R&D intensive goods is a reasonable proxy for investment in embodied technologies. Additionally, there is evidence that economies derive significant benefits in terms of five-year productivity growth rates from R&D performed by OECD countries importing machinery and equipment (Coe et al., 1997; Keller, 1998 Keller, , 2000 Engelbrecht, 2002; Barrio-Castro et al., 2002) . This supports the view that imports of certain goods contribute to technology diffusion through spillovers, at least in the mid-term.
In sum, both endogenous growth models and empirical evidence suggest that imports of R&D intensive goods rather than overall trade acts as the main channel of technology diffusion. Under this view, it should be observed that countries adopting less technology through trade have a lower productivity level. Consequently, the estimation exercise involves the disentanglement of the different determinants and their relative impact on income levels, isolating changes in income levels and changes in institutions, overall trade and technology trade that arise from changes in geography and history. To facilitate a comparison of the empirical results, we closely follow the approach by Rodrik et al. (2004) and use the same exogenous variables to instrument for total trade and institutions, respectively. Similar to the Frankel-Romer approach, we construct an instrument for technology imports that is based on geographical information only.
Technology imports and total trade, however, are highly correlated: countries that trade more also import more technology. In general, both types of bilateral trade are based on the idea that countries trade different amounts because they face different prices. For instance, distance, as a proxy for transport cost, affects prices of different goods in a similar way, thereby making it difficult to assess the independent contribution of each trade channel to income levels. Nevertheless, the estimation of the effect of technology imports on income may be isolated from the overall price effect by simply taking into consideration that countries may import more capital goods because they have different abilities to make use of them. These advantages come in the form of abundance of skilled workers or an efficient economic environment. Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that geographic barriers to trade in equipment explain a high percentage of international differences in productivity due to variations in relative prices of equipment once a country's ability to make use of technologies is controlled with fixed effects. Also, Caselli and Wilson (2004) show that large differences in investment composition across countries (measured by imports of different capital goods) are based on each equipment type's degree of complementarity with other factors whose relative abundance is country specific.
In effect, we simultaneously estimate the effects of technology imports, overall trade, institutions, and geography on per-capita income using appropriate instruments for each of the three variables. Like Rodrik et al. (2004) , we find that institutions clearly dominate over trade and geography in the income equation. Yet we show that technology imports have a positive impact on per-capita income levels and that this outcome is robust to various robustness checks. In addition, we use this framework to study the channels through which technology imports affect per-capita income levels.
Breaking down output per worker into components, we evaluate the extent to which technology imports contribute to capital depth, human capital and total factor productivity differences. Once controlling for endogeneity, we find that technology diffusion through imports accounts for much of the variations in technological levels across countries.
In a preceding paper on the role of capital goods imports on economic growth, Lee (1995) In general, gravity models in empirical studies are based on the simple idea that bilateral trade between country i and country j is a function of their physical distance and respective sizes. Economies of scale and complementarities play the key role in the theoretical foundations of this model. Trade between two economies which share a common border is more likely than trade between two economies separated by an ocean or a long distance ceteris paribus. Additionally, a small economy tends to trade more with a large country than two large countries between them.
A bilateral trade equation for technology products, derived from the gravity model, may have several specifications. Above all, a country's technology imports are negatively related to its distance to the technological leaders and positively to its respective size.
We depart from a simple linear specification and estimate in logarithms, including various measures of size and proximity: where m ijt represents technology imports by country i from country j divided by the GDP of the importing country at time t, D stands for the distance between countries i and j, A for (land) area, and P for population size. L is a dummy variable taking the value one when the country i or j has access to an ocean and zero otherwise. Cont represents another dummy to account for the fact that some countries share a common border (value equal to one) or not (zero). Importantly, all these explanatory variables are based on the geography of a country, that is, we estimate the influence of geography on imports of technology commodities originated from OECD economies. In addition, we include interactions between contiguity and distance, area, and population to explore the fact that countries with a common border trade more with each other. Included in the analysis are all countries that reported trade data to the United Nations for the estimation period from 1965 to 1995 and for which data for all other variables are obtainable.
6 That leaves us with a sample of 108 countries.
Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors that are robust to clustering, since country pairs are likely to be dependent across years.
Additionally, we use time dummies given the possibility of aggregate shocks, that is, transport cost reductions. The results are shown in Table 2 . The model explains 46 per cent of variations in bilateral technology imports from R&D performing countries to the rest of the world with a total of 54,395 observations. Column 1 shows the coefficients and column 2 the interaction terms of each variable to contiguity. The results are broadly as expected, that is, they have the expected sign and are highly significant at the 1 or 5 per cent level. Distance is the most influential variable with a coefficient below one. Area of the importer country is negatively related to technology imports, confirming the presumption that small countries tend to trade more with the rest of the world. The same can be said about the area of the exporter economy, i.e., the larger the area of the technology exporter the less are the technology imports from that exporter. Countries with a large population in absolute terms tend to acquire more technology through imports, yet the elasticity is very low and not significant. On the other hand, the technology exporter's population is also positively associated with imports, and the coefficient is highly significant. Landlocked economies tend to import 47 per cent less technology. Moreover, technology imports increase if the exporter economy is landlocked.
The results for the interactions with contiguity suggest that trade between countries sharing a common border is thirteen times larger than trade with the remaining countries. The interactions of contiguity with respect to importer's and exporter's area are positive and significant. Having a larger population in the importer and in the exporter economies reduces technology imports when countries share a common border.
All time dummies are significant, positive and increasing in time. This is likely to be due to the observed reduction in transport costs over time and due to a time trend.
Following our estimation strategy, once the bilateral technology import model has been estimated, a simple aggregation allows us to obtain the value of the overall technology imported explained by a pure model of geography. We define ijt m log as the vector of predictions of equation (1):
where βˆ is the coefficients vector estimated in the model (a 0 , a 1 , ..., a 15 ) and ijt X is the vector of variables considered. Hence, the appropriate instrument for technology imports ijt M can be computed as:
Empirical Specification
After the computation of the instrument for technology imports, we next introduce the specification of the econometric model to assess the determinants of per-capita income levels. In line with previous studies, we use a simple framework in which the log of Needless to say, apart from the distance from the equator, which is quantified as absolute value of latitude of the capital city, 7 all explanatory variables are endogenous.
Thus, we will first estimate equation (4) using ordinary least squares (OLS) and then employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to capture the effect of variations in geography and history (exogenous) in the three endogenous variables. Our approach involves using Hall and Jones (1999) instruments for institutions, that is, the fraction of population speaking English or another major European language and a geographical variable (distance from equator), since employing alternative instruments, such as the settler mortality rates as in Acemoglu et al. (2001) would severely reduce the sample size. For overall trade, we rely on the Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument, while we use our own instrument for technology imports as described in the previous section.
While our sample of 108 countries is smaller than the largest sample of Rodrik et al. (2004) , which consists of 140 countries, it is nevertheless larger than their preferred 7 To examine the robustness of the results, we later on add several other measures of geography.
sample of 80 countries. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 3 
Empirical Results
We start the presentation of the empirical findings with an overview of the first-stage regression results, which provide useful information about the overall relevance of our instruments ( (Table 5 ).
We also find that our instrument's predictions are moderately correlated, except with the predicted value of technology imports and predicted trade (correlation equal to 0.91). We will assess the potential consequence of this outcome below. Following this, we present the outcome of the estimation for equation (4). The first two columns in Table 6 reflect the influence of trade on income once we control for distance from the equator (geography). Similar to previous findings, openness to trade does not exert a significant influence on income in the two-stage approach. We then extend the model and include institutions in the next two columns. These are the basic specifications of Rodrik et al. (2004) . The fifth and sixth columns extend the model to include technology imports and to capture the particular effect that arises from the interaction with the more advanced economies through trade. In the instrumental variable regressions, institutions are still positive and significant but the coefficient is slightly smaller than in the previous specification. While trade openness also has a significant negative impact on income, the coefficient for technology imports is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level.
The test for the overidentifying restrictions shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous. This outcome supports our choice of the set-up of the instrumental variable approach to identify the separate effects of trade and technology imports on income, apart from the rest of the influences. Above all, the results imply that geography and history shape the world income distribution in the base year through institutional quality and technology imports.
The first-stage regressions, reported in Table 4 , confirm that our set of instruments is strongly related to the endogenous determinants of income. However, it is difficult to evaluate the instruments' relevance when we use them at the same time for all three endogenous variables. We have shown above that predicted technology imports and predicted overall trade are strongly correlated and this may complicate the identification in the second stage of the separate effect of both variables on income. We assess this issue by reporting Shea's (1997) To check the robustness of this outcome, we perform various additional tests by using different variables in Table 7 . It can be argued that countries in a given geographic location perform systematically better than others and that these differences may explain the results. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Irwin and Terviö (2002) suggest that previous studies evaluating the effect of trade on income such as Frankel and Romer (1999) are not robust to the inclusion of latitude as an explanatory variable. To address this concern, we include latitude instead of distance from equator 8 and reestimate by 2SLS the most comprehensive model specification, that is, including geography, institutions, trade and technology imports. Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that smaller countries tend to trade more than large countries. To control for this fact, we include two measures of size, i.e., population and 
Channels Through which Technology Imports Affect Productivity
In a further empirical analysis, we depart from Hall and Jones (1999) development accounting exercise to detect the channels through which technology imports affect productivity in the cross section of countries. The log of GDP per worker may be broken down into the three components of total factor productivity, human capital and physical capital:
, K is the stock of physical capital, h is a measure of human capital per worker based on schooling years, and A is the total factor productivity term.
The exercise comprises the regressing of each component of output per worker on the distance from equator, rule of law, total trade, and technology imports following the 2SLS estimation procedure. In our analysis, we employ the same dataset that Hall and Jones (1999) use for their computations.
9 Unfortunately, merging both datasheets implies that four observations are lost, which reduces the sample to 104 countries. On a priori grounds one expects to find a strong correlation between technology imports and physical capital, because importing technology is a way of accumulating new capital goods, as stressed by the traditional growth theory. Additionally, we can expect to find a high correlation between technology imports and the index of neutral technology, as emphasised by the technology diffusion literature. Table 8 shows the estimation results of the level accounting exercise. It is worth noting that the model presents similar coefficients for output per worker as for per-capita income. Institutions matter for the three components, but both technology imports and openness affect GDP per worker only through total factor productivity. Hence, while importing technology raises total factor productivity, increasing overall trade openness may hurt it. 
Concluding Remarks
Countries' income levels differ in the long run mainly because the ability to use resources differs. Institutions, geography and economic integration are the three plausible explanations of the deep determinants in economic success. Prior studies have detected that the effect of institutional quality predominates over the effect of trade in explaining these differences. However, recent theories and evidence suggest that trade in capital goods (and not overall trade) is a conduit of R&D spillovers, and that importer countries obtain significant benefits in terms of mid-term productivity growth.
We reconcile these two strands of the literature by estimating separately the effects of trade on income levels from the effects of technology imports and other deep determinants. We construct an instrument for technology imports based on geography, exploiting the idea that bilateral total trade and technology trade patterns are likely to be affected in a similar way by geography. However, since institutions affect the ability of countries to use new technologies, technology imports is affected in a different way than overall trade. To the extent that such trade is determined by geography and history, we obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the effects of technology imports on income, output per worker and total factor productivity levels.
We find evidence that institutions influence development and overall trade openness reduces income levels, though the trade variable is not always significant. In the longrun, however, technology diffusion through trade increases income levels via total factor productivity, in turn reducing the income gaps among countries. At a country level, these results are in line with those reported by Blalock and Veloso (2005) , who use firm-level data for Indonesian manufacturing firms and find that (technology)
imports are a driver of technology transfer. To sum up, to raise income levels the total trading volume is not as important as the trade composition, in particular when it comes to technology imports. Fraction of the population living in tropical areas Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
Appendix B: Definition of Variables and Data Sources

Land in Tropics
Share of the land area in tropical area Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; due to space constraints, time dummies are not reported; significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels are denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. Note: Coefficients and t-statistics based on a linear regression fit between income, a constant and the variable.
